A nonzero-sum three-person coalition game is presented to study the evolution of complexity and diversity in cooperation, where the population dynamics of players with strategies is given according to their scores in the iterated game and mutations. Two types of differentiation emerge initially: a biased one to classes and a temporal one to change their roles for coalition. Rules to change the hands are self-organized in a society through evolution. The coevolution of diversity and complexity of strategies and interactions (or communications) are found at later stages of the simulation. Relevance of our results to the biological society is briefly discussed.
I Introduction
In a society with interacting agents, emergence of cooperation is commonly observed, while the diversity and complexity there are increased through class differentiation or temporal changes of roles. In the present article we discuss the mechanism of such evolution by adopting an iterated three-person game. The evolution of cooperative behaviors observed among selfish individuals has been a topic of debates over decades, especially among evolutionary biologists. There are two hypotheses, the genetical kinship theory and the reciprocity theory, which explain the origin of such cooperation. The kinship theory [2] gives satisfactory explanations about altruistic behavior in honeybees, ant workers, and so on. On the other hand, individuals without blood relationship to one another have to recognize and attain the cooperation in the reciprocity theory, where the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) model is most popularly studied. In the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game, two players either cooperate or defect, with the score shown in Table 1 . Computer tournaments of IPD programs were organized by Axelrod, where each player has a strategy depending on the history of hands [1] . The most successful strategy therein was the well-known Tit-for-Tat (TFT), which cooperates on the first move and then plays whatever the other player chose on the previous move. When the evolution of strategy is included, cooperation prevails in society, without any explicit indication, through the success of the TFT algorithm. Thus the emergent society is cooperative, in which the strategies therein are very simple and basically uniform by players.
In nature and in our society, the form of cooperation is not necessarily so simple. Actions are not always uniform in time or by players. In cooperation with temporal changes of actions, which we call temporal differentiation here, players change their roles through some rules. Such differentiation is seen in the following examples:
• In a shoal of fish such as sardines and herrings, the risk of being eaten by larger fish is higher on the perimeters. The fish frequently change their position and direction and share the risk.
• In a recent model of cell differentiation with competition for nourishment among cells [4] , cells actively take food or rest in turn, to form a kind of time-sharing system (while biased differentiation is observed at a later stage). Such temporal differentiation is also seen in experiments with E.Coli [8] ,
On the other hand, cooperation only among a part of the members in a group is seen, for example, in the following cases:
• In a group of birds, only a certain subgroup makes alarm calls to tell other members of the existence of predators.
• A small group of fish takes the risk of inspecting potential predators, (e.g., [6] )
To study such forms of cooperation with differentiation of roles, a two-person game is not adequate. For this we introduce and study here a simple nonzero-sum threeperson game model.
I. I Complexity and Diversity in Strategy and Communication
Another drawback in the IPD model is the lack of complexity and diversity. For the formation of cooperation, there must be some kind of communications. In the IPD model players communicate only through the information of the history of hands, obtained by the repetition of games. In the evolution of the IPD model, however, the final society is very simple with the actions Cooperate only (in some special cases Defect only), and the society is dominated only by the TFT-like strategies. Thus the model cannot explain the diversity and the complexity in our world, where various forms of communications and strategies coexist, ranging from simple to sophisticated ones.
One possible way to get rid of the drawback may be the inclusion of noise, as player's errors of actions, as has been studied by Lindgren [5] . Through evolution, the memories of previous hands are increased in the strategy, after alternations of dominant strategies.
In this model, however, the action is still "Cooperate" only (except for some intervals to get rid of the noise effect) at later generations. The strategies are still dominated by long-term versions of the TFT. Thus the noise effect is not adequate to account for the complexity and diversity.
Of course, a straightforward way to introduce complexity is by combinatorics, that is, to include a variety of hands in the game, as in chess. We do not take this direction however, because we are interested in the origin of diversity and complexity solely through the interactions of players, without implementing it in a game initially. Thus the use of a three-person game is again proposed as possibly the simplest model at the next step.
N-Person Game
There is a qualitative difference between two-person and A^-person games. (N > 3). It is mainly due to the possibility of more than two coalitions. In an N-person game, there are a variety of partitions of players into subgroups forming coalitions. To form a coalition, some communications are necessary that may take complex and diverse forms and that are made possible by temporal changes of roles in the coalition.
In the present article we study the simplest A^-person game, a deterministic threeperson, nonzero-sum game with two hands, focusing especially on the structure of the coalition. The evolution of artificial ecology of species with different strategies is studied through repeated games by players. The main topics to be discussed are • emergent forms of cooperation • the evolution of algorithms and communications • the dynamics of diversification and complexification • the nature of the society evolved Indeed our simulation shows class differentiation between exploiting and exploited players at the initial stage, and then the temporal differentiation of roles to attain the cooperativity. At later stages the coevolution between the complexity and diversity is found for communications and strategies. 2 
Modeling

Iterated Three-Person Coalition Game Model
The rules of our three-person game are as follows:
1. Each player must hand in either card 0 or 1. See Figure 1 . 2. If two players hand in the same cards, they are regarded as forming a subgroup, and gain a score (3 points). A player excluded from the subgroup cannot gain any score. If all three players hand in the same cards, they cannot get any score, either.
The payoff matrix is given in Table 2 . In the table, we distinguish right and left players, assuming that the three players are located in a circle so that each player has a right and left player. Of course the rules of our game keeps the right/left symmetry. However, each player is assumed to be able to distinguish the right and left players, which is essential to the choice of strategy, as will be seen later.
Artificial Life Volume 2, Number 3 Table 2 . Payoff Matrix of Our Three-Person Coalition Game. The number 0 or I in column 2, 3, or 4 represents, respectively, the card that the left player, the right player, or you have handed in. According to the hands of the three players, there are eight states, which are defined through the binary representation of their hands, as is given. If and only if your state is between 2 and 5, you are in a subgroup and can get three points. In each round of the game, a player hands in the cards repeatedly in succession until a given maximum round number -is reached. Such iterated actions of three players as a whole will be called simply an interaction. The cards to be handed in by each of the players are decided according to their strategy, referring to the history of the states, defined by the hands of the three players as in Table 2 . The coding of the strategy algorithm is given by defining an octonary tree structure according to the history of the states, as in the binary tree coding by Ikegami [31.
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The memory length, that is the number of prior rounds to be referred for the strategy, is provided for each algorithm, which is finite within a given fixed range. Thus, the next card to be handed in is decided according to the finite length history of states. Also, the information of the first card is given in each player's algorithm. Figure 2 is an example of the game play, where players 1, 2, and 3 are located in a counter-clockwise order, and the state is decided according to Table 2 .
By taking an ensemble of players and regarding the players with the same strategy as the same species, we study the population dynamics of each species. The population dynamics is defined as follows: In each step, a player makes the three-person game Figure 2 . An example of the game play. The horizontal axis shows rounds, while the the vertical axis shows the states of the players. Dotted lines are drawn near states 2 and 5. Players whose state is between these dotted lines can get three points. with all possible pairs of the other players, including those from its own species. By summing up the points of the game, a player's, and accordingly the species' score is given. The fraction of the population x¡(t) for a species i is updated, following its average score s¡ decreased by the average points of all the players s-1
where d is a growth constant. After all the fractions x¡(t) are updated, they are normalized to make the population size 1.0.
When the population is updated to the next generations, a single point mutation of the algorithm occurs with a given fixed ratio (0.1 in later examples). Here the mutation adds or removes one branch at every node in the tree of the algorithm.
As noted previously, both the game and the algorithm are deterministic. Thus all three players of the same species hand in the same cards for each round. Because the state and the memory length are finite, the change of the state must finally fall in a periodic cycle through the iteration of the game. The rounds showing the cyclicchange of states will be called a periodic part, while those before the periodic part will be called a transient part.
Differentiation of Roles
In order to gain some points, the cooperation of three players is necessary, where one of the other two players gives in and plays the role of an outsider from the subgroup, or that of two players making the remaining player the odd man out. In either case, three players must split into two and one to gain points.
As will be observed from the result of the simulation, there are two kinds of differentiation.
• Class differentiation: A biased differentiation. The roles are fixed by players, and a particular player loses on the average and is exploited by others. (Figure 3a ) • Temporal differentiation: The roles of players to form coalitions change with time. (Figure 3b )
If one of the players is out of the coalition in turn, each player gets two points on the average, and full and equal cooperation is attained. If the interaction is not far from this ideal situation, we call it cooperative interaction, where the average scores are high (close to 2), and their difference by players is small. The interaction by the temporal differentiation provides a typical example.
It may be useful to note the important difference between our game and the PD, besides the number of players. In the PD, the two hands, C(ooperate) or D(efect) have their specific meaning, and the game is asymmetric between C and D. Thus the evolved strategy as well as the action should strongly depend on C or D. In our three-person game, the hands 0 and 1 themselves are symmetric and have no specific meanings. Information to make some kind of communication and form a subgroup is given in the time series of the hands. As will be seen, societies of various types of periodic hands such as the period-3 of 001 or period-5 of 00101 are formed through evolution. I If the score of a species is below the average s and its population goes down below a given value (KillLimit), it is assumed to be extinct, and the species is eliminated. 
Simulation Results
We have carried out simulations of the three-person game, setting the maximum round number to 1,000, and the maximum memory length to 4. The simulation starts with six species whose algorithms are given by the tree made randomly with the memory length = 1. First we present a rough sketch of the evolution of our model; detailed accounts will be given later. Through several simulations, we reach the following scenario of the evolutionary process leading to the complex and cooperative society: 1. A new species arising from mutations leads to class differentiation, which lowers the score of the old species and its population. Thus the society tends to be dominated by the new species. 2. This dominance is broken by the emergence of cooperative interactions, supported by periodic temporal differentiation. The ratio of cooperative interactions increases with the evolution.
3. The temporal differentiation of periodic changes of hands with the in period (n = 1, 2,...) dominates the society. The whole species therein shows the identical patterns of the hands at the periodic part, while the diversification occurs only in the transient part. 4. Some mutants that also change the periodic part increase their population, and dominant periods in the society are changed. After having experienced alternations of some dominant periods, the society starts to allow for the coexistence of various periods. With this increase of diversity, the interaction and strategy increase the complexity through the appearance of longer periods.
All the simulations support the above evolutionary process, although there are subtle differences by simulations in the period of the cyclic change of hands and the order of societies realized.
Class Differentiation and the Emergence of Cooperation
Class Differentiation
In our three-person game, some kind of rules, such as the periodic exclusion from a subgroup, must be formed by the players to gain points in the game. Such rules, however, are not easily formed. Except for some special initial conditions that allow for such cooperation by chance, some players are ignorant of the rule of cooperation and are exploited by others. This leads to class differentiation. Because those who exploit others get higher scores, exploitation is increased through evolution. With generations, new species with a longer memory length appear that adopt a more complicated rule to exploit others. Thus class differentiation with a more complex strategy emerges successively. The simplest example of class differentiation is shown in Figure 4a , where two players of the same species handing in the card 0 exclude the remaining player from the subgroup. (Note again that the player of an even state hands in card 0, while that of the odd state hands in card 1. See Table 2 .) In this simple case, the excluded player could have escaped this exploitation if it adopted a simple two-memory length strategy such as "if excluded twice by the same cards, change the hand." Indeed this type of mutation occurs at a later stage, while there appears a more complicated form of the exploitation as in Figure 4b and c by using a longer memory length. For example, in 4c, the player changes cards when excluded twice, but still it is exploited with the rate 2/3. The excluded player again can escape from the exploitation by having a longer memory length of the strategy (4 in this case). Thus the complexity is increased within the class differentiation, where a species with a complex strategy (with a longer memory length) dominates over a long time.
Emergence of Cooperation and Its Evolution
In a class differentiation, the dominant species increases its population by exploiting other species. Thus, when the species occupies most populations of the society, it cannot get scores any more. If a new species appears that is not exploited by the dominant one and they cooperate with each other (Figure 5a ), its relative population is increased. Thus the society of class differentiation collapses, after which the cooperation expands in the society. An example is given in Figure 5 , where in 5c at a later generation, the players get points by the cooperation with periodic differentiation of roles. Figure S . The emergence of cooperation and its evolution, (a) A (right) player from species ID400 hands in card 0, while the left player from ID400 and one from ID432 hand in card I. Thus, both species can get gains. This is an example of imperfect cooperation where two species gain unequal average score. In (a) to (c), the increasing element of temporal differentiation, by which participating species get a more even score, can be observed in each interaction. Figure 6 . Temporal differentiation in a uniform period-6 society, (a) and (b) are representatives of interactions in a society where all interactions are period-6. (c) is a sample of the pseudo period-6 interaction, which will destroy the period-6 society.
Temporal Differentiation 3.2.1 Stable and Uniform Society with Temporal Differentiation of Period-3n
After the emergence of cooperative interactions by the temporal differentiation, the society with the period-3« is gradually formed where the players equally exchange the role of the excluded. Furthermore, any set of three players from different species perform the same period-3n changes of hands.
An example is given in Figure 6a and b, where society with period-6 interaction emerges, and continues stably over many generations. Here, the subgroup with the hand 1 is formed, and each of the three players is excluded twice per six steps, by showing the hand 0. As shown in this example, all three players get the equal score in the period-3n society.
The Diversification of the Transient Parts
Because each player in the period-3« society gets the highest possible score among "equal-score" societies, it is rather difficult for a new species to exceed the predecessors by adopting a different type of periodic pattern. The easiest and most commonly observed strategy of a mutant at this stage is to preserve the periodic part and change the transient part, during which the equal cooperation is not attained. It should be noted that the transient part is essential to shift the phases of the period-5n oscillation by players, because they should change the hands out of phase with each other to form the cooperation. There can be a variety of choices for the transient part. Figure 7 . The successive change of periodic societies with generation: Samples of interactions from (a) period-5 society, (b) period-18, (c) another type of period-5, (d) a diversified society lasting only for a short span, and (e) period-3.
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Indeed in our simulation, new species with modified transient parts appear successively.
New Species with Interactions Indiscernible by Old Species-The End of
the Uniform Period-3n Society As the species of the period-3 n society gain points efficiently, a new species with modified periodic parts has to exploit the old period-3n species to expand its population. Because such mutation is not easy (and indeed the period-6 society lasts over many generations), it emerges only after a long enough period. First, a new species appears that shows the same period-3 n interactions fundamentally, but shifting the phase to a degree undetectable by the old species. We will call such type of interactions the "pseudo period-3w interactions," in which the periods are longer than in but some fractions of the original period-3 n interaction is included. In fact, as is shown in Figure 6c , the new species lowers the old species' points while retaining to a degree its own points by performing the "pseudo period-6 interactions." The original period-6 species cannot prevent this attack.
The Transition of Societies with Periodic Temporal Differentiation
The evolution that undermines periodic parts itself continues, even after the termination of the period-3 « society. At this stage, a variety of periodic interactions appear successively. In this simulation, the society has shifted in the flow illustrated in Figure 7 
Diversification and Complication
Evolution to Diversification
So far the society is composed mainly of one type of interaction (with the same period).
The diverse interactions are unstable and observed only in the transition between stable societies. At this late stage, however, the society consists of several different interactions with different periods, and remains stable.
Such a society appears first in our simulation as the coexistence with period-3 and period-6 interactions (See Figure 8a) , which is born out of the period-3 society. After some generations, a variety of interactions coexists as in Figure 8b and c, all of which are examples of interactions chosen from three players in the same society.
Evolution to Complexity by Breaking the Phase of Hands
The strategy to break the phase of the oscillation, already seen in the pseudo-3« interaction, is again seen here. In contrast with the pseudo-3rc case, however, more complex interactions emerge successively by breaking the phases more frequently. For example, in Figure 9b and c the periods for the cyclic hands are about 100. The dynamics here is rather irregular and looks rather unpredictable. We note that even in this society, some of the interactions remain very simple, such as the period-6 one in Figure 9a . Complex interactions exist within the diversity of species, while the diversity is supported by the complexity in strategies. 4 
Discussion
In our deterministic three-person coalition game, we have found the evolutionary process starting from class and temporal differentiation of roles, and reaching the diversification of society and the complexification of interactions. We note such evolutionary process has not been found in simulations of two-person games such as the IPD model.
The Emergence of Cooperation Due to Temporal Differentiation of Roles
When resources are scarce, or when some player must bear a dangerous role, some player must suffer loss of profits. In this case, we have found two types of differentiation to resolve such situations, class and temporal differentiation. In class differentiation, a caste society is formed where only certain parties continuously suffer some loss. In such a society, the lower class is finally extinct, and a new exploited class should be formed. This process must be repeated forever to preserve a class society, which is rather improbable. Indeed, in our simulation, such a society lasts only for some time and is typically unstable. The society finds another solution, the dynamic change of roles, which is cooperative and lasts as a stable state over many generations.
In our three-person coalition game, cards 1 and 0 themselves have no specific meanings and are symmetric. Some logic to break the symmetry and to assign meanings to the dynamics of hands is self-organized by forming rules of societies through the evolution. Here the formation of rules is partly triggered by the ability of players to distinguish the (right/left) position. We have also made several simulations without this ability (in other words, using the algorithm depending only on the number of 0 and 1 by the other two players, besides its own hand), where we have found only class differentiation, but not temporal. Thus temporal differentiation seems to be formed through the ability of the location discrimination, for example, by the rule that "each player should give in if its right player gave in in the previous round" (leading to a clockwise period-3 society).
Diversification of the Society
Societies with the temporal differentiation of various periods coexist at a later stage in our simulation. Clockwise and counter-clockwise, and cooperative and exploiting interactions coexist with different periods such as 3, 6, and 15. This diversity is possibly provided by the existence of many "metastable" solutions without an absolute advantage of any group in our three-person game, in which no a priori advantage of hands (1 or 0) is implemented. Indeed such diversification is not found in the simulation of an IPD model (with/without noise), where a stable society shows cooperative actions only, with one (or few) dominant strategy.
In reality, as in human society, there are diverse forms of cooperation, while not all the individuals participate in the cooperation itself. For example, not all birds make the alarm calls discussed in Section 1. Of course, studies of an n-person game are required for the alarm call of birds, but the observed diversity in our three-person game gives a useful suggestion for future studies.
Evolution of Complexity
With evolution, more complex interaction with longer periods has been observed. The increase of memory length, so far, has been observed in the IPD model with a noise, although the action itself is not complex there (always "cooperate" unless noise is added). In this respect, the emergence of longer memory in our deterministic threeperson game may suggest that the third player may play a kind of "noise" role, in the course of evolution.
However, the complexity in our game does not only lie in the long memory length but also in the interaction itself (or actions). Indeed there are two other essential mechanisms for the complexity: One is the competition between exploiting and avoiding being exploited. Simple rules for the coalition are easily detected by others, and may be exploited by a more complex one. Thus pressure appears for developing a complex strategy and interaction. This mechanism of evolution is common with that observed in the imitation game [7] , and reminds us of the evolution of (secret) communication codes: Those decoded only within the same group may be generated through complexity.
Another mechanism is related to diversification. In a diverse society a player has to cope with a variety of interactions. A simple strategy cannot afford such diverse responses, including, for example, denial of coalition with some players, avoiding the coalition of three players by temporal differentiation, and a coalition of two players by class differentiation. Thus diversity enhances (temporal) complexity of interactions, while the diversity itself is supported by the complexity of strategies, because the diversity of interactions is limited if their periods are short. Thus the diversity and complexity of interactions and strategies coevolve in our simulation, which seem to be seen in (real) ecological systems and in human society.
